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Abstract— Mini-drones are increasingly used in video surveil-
lance. Their areal mobility and ability to carry video cameras
provide new perspectives in visual surveillance which can
impact privacy in ways that have not been considered in a
typical surveillance scenario. To better understand and analyze
them, we have created a publicly available video dataset of
typical drone-based surveillance sequences in a car parking.
Using the sequences from this dataset, we have assessed five
privacy protection filters via a crowdsourcing evaluation. We
asked crowdsourcing workers several privacy- and surveillance-
related questions to determine the tradeoff between intelligibil-
ity of the scene and privacy, and we present conclusions of this
evaluation in this paper.
Index Terms— Mini-drones, video surveillance, dataset, pri-
vacy, crowdsourcing evaluation
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, mini-drones became widely available due to
affordable prices and stable flight performance. They are also
able to carry sophisticated video acquisition devices. One of
their main weak points is their short autonomy, a problem
that will be progressively solved, since battery technology
is also improving rapidly. Mini-drones can capture the same
scene from different points of view, and can get close to
targets. As a consequence, they can collect sensitive personal
data, which adds a new dimension to issues around privacy
and calls for appropriate privacy protection solutions.
In order to better understand the implications of such
novel devices, a publicly available video dataset1 was created
with a DJI Phantom 2 Vision+ mini-drone. The dataset is
designed for the analysis and evaluation of privacy concerns.
It consists of 38 different contents that depict a typical
surveillance scenario in a parking lot exposing different
levels of privacy intrusiveness. Participants appearing in
the video have various gender and ethnicity, are dressed
differently, and carry personal items and accessories in order
to emphasize visual privacy, i.e., personal visual information.
The sequences were processed and various privacy-sensitive
regions, including body silhouettes, faces, cars, accessories,
and license plates, were manually annotated, and stored in
an XML format.
Several state-of-the-art privacy filters were applied with
different degrees of strength to each content shot with the
mini-drone, in order to understand if a balance can be
found between privacy issues and surveillance effectiveness.
This work was conducted in the framework of Network of Excellence
VideoSense and COST Action IC1206. Special thanks to Dr. Jens Ha¨lterlein
and Dr. Leon Hempel for the valuable discussions about ethical problems
in surveillance, their help in the dataset and evaluation test creation.
1http://mmspg.epfl.ch/mini-drone
Privacy filters included simple filters such as blurring, pix-
elization and masking, as well as more advanced reversible
warping [1] and morphing [2] filters. The performance of
each tool was subjectively evaluated using a crowdsourcing
approach. Test subjects were asked to answer carefully se-
lected questions related to visual privacy and typical surveil-
lance tasks, in order to assess performance of visual privacy
protection filters. The results of this investigation allowed
us to find the right balance each filter can offer between
intelligibility and privacy protection. The evaluation results
are also included in the created dataset to help researchers
in the analysis of privacy in mini-drones and as an example
of how the dataset can be used.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The new features implemented in drone-based surveil-
lance affect visual privacy, as already observed by several
researchers [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]. However, there is a
notable lack of adequate datasets that can be used to analyze
these new surveillance devices. Many datasets exist for the
evaluation of video analytics, such as various detection,
recognition, and tracking algorithms; for instance VIRAT,
CAVIAR, ChokePoint, and PETS 2007. A few datasets were
recently created for privacy evaluations in video surveillance
when using different types of visual sensors [10], [11], but
none of them includes footage from mini-drones.
Little has been done to better understand privacy issues in
practical multimedia applications. But recently the impact
of privacy protection tools has been analyzed in video
surveillance and effective evaluation methodologies have
been developed to take into account both the context and
the content. The objective evaluation of several primitive
privacy filters was first performed by Newton et al. [12]:
the authors demonstrated that such filters cannot adequately
protect from successful face recognition, because recognition
algorithms are robust. The robustness of face recognition and
detection algorithms to primitive distortions is also reported
in [13]. Further, in a work by Dufaux et al. [14], a framework
is defined to evaluate the performance of face recognition
algorithms applied to images altered by various obfuscation
methods.
Crowdsourcing has shown to be a viable alternative to con-
ventional laboratory-based subjective assessments, especially
for cognitive tasks [11]. Crowdsourcing-based evaluation of
privacy tradeoff in video surveillance has shown good consis-
tency with laboratory-based studies [15]. The crowdsourcing
methodology benefits from a large number of participants
and can be performed efficiently and at a relatively low cost
(a) Annotated original (b) Blurring, strength 40 (c) Pixelization, strength 20
(d) Masking, strength 0.8 (e) Morphing, strength 0.95 (f) Warping, strength 5
Fig. 1: Original and filtered frames of stealing bag video from the mini-drone dataset.
(a) Normal behavior: Walking (b) Suspicious behavior: Taking pictures of the cars (c) Illicit behavior: Stealing an item
(d) Illicit behavior: Mis-parking a car (e) Illicit behavior: Crashing (f) Illicit behavior: Stealing a car
Fig. 2: Examples of dataset scenarios.
without requiring a significant commitment from subjects,
which are called workers in the crowdsourcing terminology.
Workers accept to undertake a task (usually a short 5-20
minutes task) and are grouped in larger units, called batches.
When the evaluation experiment is over, workers submit their
answers. Unlike laboratory-based experiments, crowdsourc-
ing cannot impose specific displays or controlled illumination
of surroundings in which assessments take place. However,
since standard environment and equipment conditions for
surveillance operators have not been established, typical
monitors even with different resolutions and color settings
are considered as appropriate in this study.
To display video sequences to different workers and
to collect evaluation results, we selected QualityCrowd22
framework [16] and the Microworkers3 crowdsourcing plat-
form that provide online workers from around the world.
QualityCrowd2 is an open-source framework designed for
QoE evaluation with crowdsourcing. This framework was se-
lected because it is easy to modify for our privacy evaluation
task using the provided simple scripting language for batch
creation, training sessions, and control questions.
2https://github.com/ldvpublic/QualityCrowd2
3http://microworkers.com/
TABLE I: Questions asked in the crowdsourcing study (left column) and the choice of the answers (right column).
Question Choice of answers
1. What is the main activity happening in the video? Stealing a car, attacking a driver, stealing an item, walking,
parking a car, taking pictures, I do not know
2. How many people do you see? One, two, three, four, five, I do not know
3. Is there any of the following items? (select all that apply) Backpack, umbrella, photo camera, papers, wallet, none,
I do not know
4. What is the GENDER of the person in the red box? Male, female, I dont know
5. What is the ETHNICITY of the person in the red box? White, African, Asian, I dont know
6. Which accessories does the person in the red box wear? Jacket, sunglasses, glasses, helmet, shorts, hat, hoodie,
(select all that apply) none of the above, I do not know
TABLE II: Scenarios depicted in the video dataset.
Type of scenario Main action Gender, Age and Ethnicity
Normal A person tries to fix his broken down car; Caucasian man;
People walk in the car parking; Caucasian men and women, Asian guy;
A driver parks his car and leaves on foot; Caucasian man;
A driver gets into his car and leaves; Caucasian man;
Suspicious A person falls down and asks for help; Asian girl;
A driver parks his car and join two people, they start talking stealthily; Caucasian men and woman;
Loitering people in the car parking Caucasian guys and girl, Asian guy;
A person takes pictures of the parked cars; Asian guy;
Illicit A person pushes the driver outside his car and steals the vehicle; Caucasian men;
Two people start arguing and fighting; Asian and Caucasian guys;
A driver parks his car in the middle of the road and leaves; Caucasian man;
A woman parks his car and takes up two lots; Caucasian woman;
A driver parks his car in the forbidden area and leaves; Caucasian man;
A cyclist crashes with a pedestrian; Caucasian and Asian girls;
A person puts some bottles into a parking lot; Asian girl;
A person steals or tries to steal a car; Caucasian girl and guy;
A person steals a wallet, a bag or a backpack; Caucasian and Asian guys and girls;
A person approaches a car and steals it, two people are on lookout; Caucasian guys;
III. DATASET CREATION
Drone-based surveillance is particularly advantageous
when it is not possible to set up a full-fledged surveillance
system, for example, when a temporary major event such as
a concert or a marathon is organized. Mini-drones can be
used for monitoring the area, helping in managing parking
spaces, controlling crowds and reporting useful information
such as suspicious behaviors, mis-parked cars, number of
free parking spots, etc.
A video dataset suitable for privacy inspection in drone-
based video surveillance should have appropriate features:
• Practical scenarios: since many vehicles are left unat-
tended, theft and vandalism are common. Therefore,
most of the dataset videos show suspicious people and
criminal behaviors;
• Different levels of privacy intrusiveness: the impact
on the privacy of those under surveillance is variable,
because the drone can remain still or move, it can
follow, get closer or rotate around a person or a vehicle;
• Emphasis on people’ visual privacy: the recorded videos
should not only include facial information but also
ethnicity, age, gender, personal items, and accessories;
• Emphasis on vehicles visual privacy: the recorded
videos should include information about the license
plate, the model, and the color;
• Varying environment and illumination conditions: in
order to thoroughly evaluate the performance of privacy
protection;
• Video of high quality: the sensitive privacy regions
should be clearly visible if unprotected.
The created dataset consists of 38 different contents cap-
tured in full HD resolution, with a duration of 16 to 24
seconds each, shot with the mini-drone Phantom 2 Vision+
in a parking lot. The dataset contents can be clustered in
three categories: normal, suspicious, and illicit behaviors.
The scenarios are reported in Table II and examples are
shown in Figure 2. Normal content depicts people walking,
getting in their cars and parking their vehicles. In suspicious
content, nothing a priori wrong happens but people act in
a questionable way. Contents with illicit behaviors show
people mis-parking their vehicles, stealing items and cars,
or fighting. All participants read and signed a consent form,
stating they agree to appear with their vehicles in the video.
IV. DATASET ANNOTATION
The sensitive data, also referred to as regions of inter-
est, ROIs, were manually annotated using the open source
ViPER-GT tool4 and provided in flexible XML format. For
every video, frame-by-frame annotations for each person and
vehicle were performed manually. The following privacy-
related regions were annotated:
• Body silhouette: Rectangle around the body region with
recorded information about gender, ethnicity and age.
Stored information about the surveillance scenario: the
4http://viper-toolkit.sourceforge.net/
main action, such as stealing or parking, and the role,
such as thief or driver;
• Facial region: Rectangle around the face;
• Accessories. Rectangle around each personal item such
as bag, backpack, sunglasses, hat, wallet or bottle;
• Vehicle: Rotated rectangle around the vehicle body, car
or bicycle.
• License plate: Rotated rectangle around the license
plate. Number of license plate recorded;
• Video capture: Information about video format, includ-
ing resolution, frame rate, and the total number of
frames.
Since our dataset was created to evaluate different aspects
and definitions of privacy, the attribute ‘level of privacy
content’ is reported for each ROI and defined as low (L),
medium (M), or high (H). It is related to the distance between
the region and the drone and to the amount of visible details.
The ROIs face and license plate are more sensitive than the
others. A person can be recognized more easily if his face
is visible and the number of the license plate can help to
identify the owner of the vehicle. Therefore, their default
value for ‘level of privacy content’ attribute is H while for
other regions of interest it is set to L.
V. VISUAL PRIVACY FILTERS
Privacy protection tools have been already applied to
surveillance-related video datasets [15], [17]. Based on these
studies, a number of popular protection tools including
blurring, pixelization, and masking filters, but also more
complex filters such as warping [1] and morphing [2] were
applied. The choice of the filters parameters is a challenging
issue by itself, because the perspective of the on-board
camera can suddenly change and result in a change of
size for privacy sensitive regions in a video sequence. The
approach suggested in [18] was adopted, which focused
on the performance of recognition algorithms in privacy
evaluation. The strength levels were selected according to
the following four categories: (i) mild, when the filter is
almost imperceptible, (ii) noticeable, when the filter is clearly
visible and leads to obfuscation of some minor details such as
license plates, (iii) clearly visible, when most of the protected
objects in the video are obfuscated, and (iv) completely
obfuscating when the filter yields its maximum protection.
The strength was adjusted by changing the Gaussian kernel
size for the blurring filter to values 5, 20, 40, and 60, the size
of the averaging block for the pixelization filter to values 5,
10, 20, and 50, the opacity for the rectangular masking filter
to values 0.2, 0.6, 0.8, and 1.0, the value added to the shifted
points for the warping filter to values 1, 2, 5, and 20, and
the weights of the pixel intensities for the morphing filter to
values 0.1, 0.4, 0.8, and 0.95. Figure 1 illustrates the original
annotated content and the results of applying the filters to a
sample video frame.
Privacy protection filters were applied to body silhouettes
and cars. In this way, faces, license plates, and accessories
were also filtered at the same time.
VI. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
The crowdsourcing assessment aims to check whether a
given surveillance task can be performed or an individual’s
behavior can be detected, even after the privacy protection
filters are applied. For this purpose, each crowdsourcing
worker was asked to watch a video sequence and to answer to
one of the questions in Table I, as per the approach proposed
in [17] and [18].
The first three questions were created to measure the
amount of intelligibility. The answers to the last three
questions permit instead to determine how much privacy
sensitive information such as ethnicity and gender or other
privacy related details still remain visible after filtering. It
should be noted that a red box was drawn in the video to
avoid confusion regarding the person to which questions 4,
5 and 6 in Table I referred to. The 3rd and 6th questions
were multiple-choice. The answer “I don’t know” could also
be selected for all the questions posed. The Microworkers
platform provides online workers with the ability to choose
the location of workers, which was selected in countries
where English is a dominant language.
Seven different contents were selected from the dataset to
evaluate the performance of the privacy tools. The contents
depict the scenarios: attacking a driver, mis-parking a car,
stealing a wallet, stealing a backpack, people talking, stealing
a car, and taking pictures of the cars. They show a vari-
ety of sensitive regions and individuals’ behavior. Original
sequences in 1920 × 1080 resolution were compressed in
MPEG-4, converted to Flash Video format, and played back
at a resolution of 960×540 to make sure the video could be
properly decoded and represented by most common browsers
and on typical monitors.
In total, 21 different video sequences were created for
each content (the original, plus 20 filtered versions) for
assessment. To ensure a statistically significant number of
evaluations for each sequence, 40 subjects were assigned to
each sequence, with a total of 840 subjects participating in
the evaluations.
The sequences corresponding to the same content were
randomly distributed among the batches; special care was
devoted to guarantee that each subject assessed only one
version of a given content. Since every subject has to
answer six questions for seven contents, 42 steps should
be performed to complete a batch. After each question,
subjects were asked to report also how certain they were
about their answer. Each batch starts with a training session
describing the evaluation procedure. A display brightness test
is performed using a method similar to that described in [19].
VII. EVALUATION RESULTS
Since the major shortcoming of the crowdsourcing-based
subjective evaluation is the inability to supervise participants
behavior and to restrict their test conditions, there are several
techniques to exclude unreliable workers [19]. To identify a
worker as ‘trustworthy’, the following four approaches were
used in our crowdsourcing evaluation:
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Fig. 3: Correct answers for different filters and their strength by workers from crowdsourcing evaluation.
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Fig. 4: Certain & correct, certain & incorrect, and uncertain answers for different filters and their strength by workers from
crowdsourcing evaluation.
• Two ‘Honeypot’ questions were inserted in each batch.
These are the obvious easy-to-answer questions to de-
tect people who do not pay attention;
• Task completion time of the worker;
• Mean time spent on each question by the worker;
• Deviation of the time spent on each question by the
worker.
Based on these factors, 456 out of 840 (54% of total)
workers were found to be reliable with 19 to 24 reliable
workers for each tested video sequences, which ensures the
statistical significance of the evaluation results.
Figure 3 demonstrates the crowdsourcing evaluation re-
sults for each privacy protection filter and their different
strength levels. The figure shows how each filter affects
the visibility of different regions when applied at different
strength. The bars represent the average across different
video contents of correct answers grouped according to the
questions from Table I, as shown on the x-axis. Each plot in
the figure also shows the results for original ‘unfiltered’ video
sequence for the ease of comparison. The average deviation
of the correct answers across different contents is about 18%
with less than 10% for original video, about 10% for the
minimal levels of strength, and up to 28% for high strength
levels.
Figure 4 illustrates the effects of filters strength levels on
certainty with which workers answered the questions. The
total number of answers are split into those that were certain
and correct, certain and incorrect, and uncertain. An ideal
privacy protection filter would lead to high uncertainty but
very low number of certain and incorrect answers, because
surveillance related judgements based on wrong information
are not desirable.
Figure 3 demonstrates a general trend of filters able to
decrease the number of correct answers to all questions when
high strength levels are used. The least affected are questions
about the number of people (question 2 in Table I) and gender
(question 4 in Table I).
From the presented figures, it can be noted that basic filters
such as blurring and pixelization are able to achieve the better
tradeoffs, as they cluster towards intermediate values of both
privacy and intelligibility. Also, they lead to less certain and
incorrect answers, as shown in Figure 4a and Figure 4b.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a publicly available dataset designed
for the analysis and evaluation of privacy concerns in mini-
drone video surveillance. Using this dataset, we have investi-
gated for the first time the performance of privacy protection
filters in drone-based video surveillance. We have applied
five typical privacy protection tools with four different levels
of strength. The filtered sequences have been evaluated by
the workers of a crowdsourcing platform, and the results have
been analyzed to investigate the balance between intelligibil-
ity and privacy protection of different privacy filters.
More advanced privacy protection filters like scrambling
[20] or encryption-based tools will be exploited in the
continuation of the present study. Different questions could
also be selected, for example related to the age and the
expression of the person. Other privacy-related features could
be studied too, such as those related to the identification of
the vehicles (the license plate, but also the details of the
wheels, or stickers that may be present). Video content from
CCTV should be compared to the mini-drone video dataset
to highlight the versatility of the latter.
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